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A F erninist Social Justice 
Approach to Reproduction-Assisting 
Technologies: A Case Study on the 
Limits of Liberal rfheory* 
BY JOAN C. CALLAHAN** 
AND DOROTHY E. ROBERTS*** 
INTRODUCTION 
I n recent years, child welfare agencies in the Uni ted States have seized thousands of infants who have been exposed prenatally to 
various illicit drugs.' A number of these seizures have resulted in the 
* Portions of this Article have been adapted with permission from Joan C. 
Callahan, The Contract Motherhood Debate, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 82 (1993); 
Joan C. Callahan & Patricia Smith, Liberalism. Communirarianisnt, and 
Femimsm, in LIBERALISM AND COMMUNITY (Noel Reynolds el al. eds., 
forthcomjng); Joan C. Callahan, Professions, Institutions, and Moral Risk, in 
D ANIEL E. WUESTE, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 243 
( 1994); Feminism and Reprod11ctive Technologies, 5 J. CLII'\!C.A.L ETHICS 75 
( 1994); Editor's Introduction: Reproduction. Ethics. and the Law: Feminist 
Perspectives ,in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMII': IST PERSPECTIVES 
I (Joan C. Callahan ed .. 1995); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts 
Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 
HARV. L. REv. 141 9 ( 1991); Dorothy E. Robcns, Social Justice, Procreative 
Liberty, and the Limits of Liberal Theo1:v: Robertson's Children of Choice, 20 
L. & SOC. INQUIRY I 005 ( 1995). Special thanks to Pat Smith for permission to 
adapt material here from her paper wah Joan Callahan. 
** Professor of Philosophy, Uni versity ':)fKcntucky. Ph.D. 1982, University 
of Maryland. 
*** Professor of Law. Rutgers University. B.A. 1977, Yale College; J.D. 
1980, Harvard Law School. 
1 See, e.g., Janet Gallagher, Collective B<"ld Fctith and Protecting the Fetus, 
in REPRODUCTION, ETII ICS, AND THE L AW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 343 (Joan 
C. Callahan ed., ! 995); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts 'YVho Have 
Babies: Women ofColor, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
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prosecution of women for drug use during pregnancy as a form of child 
abuse.2 Despite the fact that drug use during pregnancy seems to be 
equally prevalent among women of all races in the United States, studies 
are beginning to show that black women are nearly ten times more likely 
than other women to be reported to child wei fare agencies for drug use 
during pregnancy, and that at least seventy percent of the prosecutions are 
of women of color.> Additionally, over eighty percent of coun-ordercd 
cesarean sections have been for \.VOmen of co lor and non-native United 
States women. These women arc vi1tually always dependent on public 
health care fac ilities: What's wrong with this picture? 
ln December 1990, Norplant, the contrncepti ve implant, was approved 
in the United States.5 Almost immediately, cou11s attempted to impose 
the implantation of Norpbnt a a condition of probation on women 
convicted of child abuse. 0 In seventy-five percent of these cases, the 
probationers have been minonty women, and all of them have been 
welfare recipients. 7 What's wrong with this picture? 
Liberals argue that women contracting mto so-called surrogate mother 
arrangements should be held to the1r contracts.~o; Since these contracts are 
usually sought by men who \vant the!!· own sperm used to progenerate, 
this would ensure that lhcs~ men obtain children who are genetically 
14 19 ( 199 1 ). 
1 Roberts. supra note I. at I ~·2 i. 
1 /d. at 1434. 
~ Gallagher,s11pra nmc : . ac 35·+. 
s rvtelissa Burke, Note, 7i'Ie Con.srittdionaliry o.f the U'ie qf the Nmplam 
Contraceptive: Del'ice ,,s a Ccmditiflll of' Pl·tJt]a rion , 20 I {ASTII·JGS C'ONs·r. L.Q. 
107. 207 ( 1992). 
h /d. 
1 See Joan C. Ca llahan. Co!ln·u~.-·,_,Jnioil or fncarcera;ion: What's Wrona wirh 
this Picwre?, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y R!·V. 6"1 (1996); Burke, supra note 5, at 24 1. 
s See, e.g., JOHN ROBERTSON, { fill DREl-l OF C HOICE: FREEDOM AND THF.. 
NEW R~PRODUCTIVE Tt:CHNOt.Or;ll;'> ( 1 99~f ). We take it that t he tenn ·'suiTogatc 
mother" is nu longer acccptalJk Mi;sim:-diy, the lCm1 b.;gs the question of who 
is the real mother nf a t:hild btJf1l iiS tk r.::sult uf a contract amangement. Birth 
mothers are certainly bio l ogic~ I mo1 h~rs or. the chi ldren they bear and birth, even 
when they are not genr..:tic mDthers. ('L•ntract motherhood aiTangements between 
women anJ men usually 111\ olv.; ~'rogem~t·ation from the man's sperm a11d the 
gestational mother's egg, making her as ftJ!Iy the ~:hlld's genetic parent as the 
geneti c father. To ca ll such a -.vcnnan a "surrogate" mother (as was done in the 
case of Baby M) is to elevate u :nan's g\~n :;tic r;onne•; tion to a child over a 
woman's gc:stational and genr:Li1· ('l•nMeiil'n io 1hat child. The 1.:rn1 "smJ"ogatc" 
is just one cx.nmple of how de.~ply r-tJllbf:dded mal.:! rrivileg~ i~. in our so..;iety. 
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related to them. Even wi thout state enforcement of these contracts, in 
every case that has gone ro court m the United States, men have 
succeeded in gaining custody of resulting children who are genetically 
related to them, whether or not the gestational mothers seeking custody 
were also the genetic mothers of the children at issue.9 What's wrong 
with this picture? 
Specialized fertility services (such as ovulation drugs, 10 in vitro 
fertilization ("IVF") and embryo trans fer, 11 gamete intra fallopian 
transfer ("GIFT"),12 zygote intrafallopian transfer ("ZIFT"),13 artificial 
insemination, 14 surgery, or other treatment for blocked fallopian 
tubes 15) are twice as likely to be obtained by non-Hispanic white women 
than by Hispanic or non-Hispanic black women seeking treatment for 
impaired fecundity, and three times more likely to be obtained by such 
women who have household incomes at least 149% above the poverty 
level than by those with lower household incomes. 16 What's wrong with 
this picture? 
What is wrong with all of these pictures is that they suggest that there 
are systematic inequities along the axes of sex, race, and class in several 
areas of contemporary human reproduction. We find these inequities 
troubling. Our purpose in this paper is threefold: ( 1) to suggest how 
9 See. e.g., Christine Overall, The Case Against the Legalization of Contract 
M01herhood, in C HRISTINE OVERALL, HUMAN REPRODUCTION: PRI~CIPLES, 
PRACTICES. POLICIES 119 (1993); Rosemarie Tong, Feminis t Perspectives and 
Gestational Motherhood: The Search for a Unified Legal Focus, in REPRODUC-
TION, ETHICS, AND THE L AW: FEM INIST PERSPL:C I"IVES SS (Joan C. Callahan cd., 
1995 ); and several of the papers In SURROGATE YIOTIIERI-IOOD: POLl' riC$ AND 
PRIVACY (Carry Gostin ed., 1990). 
111 Drugs that cause the maturation of several of a woman's eggs at one time. 
11 '' In vitro ferti lization" IS feni lization of onl! or more of a woman's eggs 
outside of her body, e.g., in a petri dish. ''Embryo transfer" is the removal of an 
embryo from one woman 's uterus and placement of it in another woman's uterus. 
1 ~ "Gamete intrafallopian transfer" is the transfer of gametes (i.e., eggs 
and/or sperm) into a woman's fallopinn tube. 
IJ "Zygote inrrafallopian transfer" is the transfer of a newly fertilized egg 
or zygote into a woman's fallopian tube. 
14 "Artificial insemination" is the insemination of a woman with rechnologi-
cal assistance, e.g., with a syringe. 
15 The fa llopian tubes allow the transport of a woman's eggs from her 
ovaries to her uterus. Fertilization or conception usually occurs in the fallopian 
tubes. 
16 Lynna S. Wilcox & William D. Mosh~.!r, Use vfl!!{t;mility Services in the 
United States, OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY. July 1993, at 122, l 24. 
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contemporary liberal theory leads to these inequities, (2) to contribute to 
a systematic articulation and illumination of a feminist social justice 
approach to questions of law and policy that addresses concerns about 
these systemati~ inequities, and (3) to show why this approach should be 
standard in any society that purports to take the interests of all its citizens 
equally seriously, no matter what their social location. In particular, we 
mean to show that a feminist social justice approach better serves the 
fundamental moral ideals embraced by liberalism, namely individual 
liberty and the moral equality of persons, than does contemporary liberal 
theory. We do this by focusing on contemporary reproduction-assisting 
technologies as a case study to help see where contemporary liberalism 
leaves us in regard to these technologies and why that position is 
deficient on each of the liberal's own axiological axes of liberty and 
equality. 
l. THE F EMfNIST SOCIAL JUSTICF! REJECTION OF LIBERALISM 
A. Liberal individualism as Jdeolog11 
Liberal individualism is a set of general ideas that purports to explain 
the world and leads to the structuring of society and its political 
institutions according to a set of nonnative convictions that cohere with 
the explanatory beliefs intemal to the system. That is1 liberal individual-
ism functions as an idr.!o logy with certain fundamental ontological 
commitments and consequenl moral commitments. Liberal individualism 
operates according to methods that fol low from these ontological and 
moral commitments. An examination of any ideology, such as liberal 
individualism, wi ll concern itself wi th (l) how a paiiicular system of 
beliefs conceptualizes human nature, (2) how that conceptualization of 
human nature is linked to normative beliefs regarding morally appropriate 
distributions of power and goods in society, and (3) what ontological 
commitments and moral values are embedded in the methods the system 
uses to interpret, constmct, evaluate) and revise social and political 
institutions and practices, and to interpret, evaluate, and influence 
individual behaviors. In short, an ideology shapes the way a group looks 
at the world. It functions as a kind of perceptual screen or filter that 
interprets reality factually, evaluates it nom1atively, and leads to certain 
positions on what are considered social problems and how those problems 
should be resolved. As an ideology, Hberal individualism presumes an 
ontology of persons which tends to lead tu a particular set of substantive, 
nom1ative and methodological commitments. As we shall see, ::1 femini st 
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social justice approach rejects these components of contemporary 
liberalism. 
B. The L iberal Ontology of Persons and tlze Liberal Morality 
of Rights 
Historically, liberalism arose in Europe between the Reformation and 
the French Revolution as a reaction to the power of kings, aristocrats, and 
the church. One of the fi rst systematizers of liberal theory was John 
Locke, who inspired Thomas Jefferson, and whose Second Treatise of 
Civil Government11 directly underpins the United States Bill of Rights. 
Locke conceived the human person as, fundamental ly, an atomistic entity 
-a full-fledged human being existing prior to society, making up (to mix 
the metaphors) a kind of ontological moral space that cannot be 
transgressed without permission. Political auth01ity, in Locke's view, can 
only be justified on the ground of consent of the governed. All "men" 
come into the world on an equal moral footing, with equal entitlements 
to goods and powers and equal entitlements to freedom. Now, Locke, of 
course, was systematizing a political theory for Whigs. When he said "all 
men" he did not actually mean that. What he meant was dictated by his 
own experience of who counted- propenied men, including landholders, 
merchants and industrialists, who should not be subject to an absolute 
monarch. This, of course, did not include women generally) or men or 
women of the underclass in particular. 18 So, from the very beginning of 
its systematization, liberalism was structured from a perspective that 
included some persons but not others. Indeed, Locke himscJf provides the 
first fu lly systematic argument for cap1tallsm and the right to amass 
virtually unlimited amounts of property, a strange 1rony m a theory which 
starts out so uncqutvocally commmed to the moral equality of all persons 
and the initial right of each person to have ''as much and as good" as any 
other. 
The atomistic ontology of persons underpinning Locke's theory 
continues to anchor liberalism in its several contemporary varieties, 
including liberal feminism, which we shall discus$ shortly. Filled out, the 
fundamental soctal notion at work m liberal ontology is that persons arc 
radically individualized agents, that the un iqueness of human beings is 
1
; JOHN LOCKE, SECOND T REATISE or CIVIL GOVERNMENT (Lester 
DeKoster cd., 1978) (I 689). 
1 ~ See, e.g., C AROLE PATEMt\N, T JIF.DISORJJF.R OF WO~IEI\ ( 1989); CAROLE 
PATEMAN, T HE SF.XUAL CoNmAcr ( 1938). 
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characterized by the capacity for rationality and autonomy, and that the 
protection of individual autonomy is the keystone of a moraJJy well-
ordered society. The ontological understanding of human beings as 
radically discrete and autonomous tends to issue in a morality that rests 
fundamentally on rights that define the moral boundaries of these 
essentially unconnected individuals. Thus, Lockean liberalism finds itself 
committed to a morality that is preoccupied with respecting and 
negotiating these independent moral spaces. Such a world view starts out 
conceptualizing persons as adversarially related, and sets the stage for a 
political society that needs to be based on managing adversity. This 
human ontology and its consequent contemporary construction of 
fundamental morality as a morality of overriding rights to noninterference 
is central to feminist sociaJ justice rejections of liberalism. 
C. Feminism and Liberal Feminism 
Although all views appropriately characterized as feminist v iews are 
concerned with the posJtion and flounshing of all women, it is crucially 
important to realize that feminism is not monolithic. lndeed, feminists 
disagree about a great many issues. Feminist perspectives can be found 
in moral and political theories as diverse as rights-based liberalism, 
Utilitarianism, and Marxism, and in ontologies that range from essentialist 
accounts that ascribe a un ique nature to women, through pure social 
construction accounts of women's narure, 19 to positional feminisms that 
attempt to avoid the problems with essentialist and antiessentialist 
fcmini.sms by leaving open the question of women 's essential nature and 
concentrating instead on how the social position of women raises 
problems for women as such.2c1 
At the same time, however, we understand all views that are 
coherently understood as femi nist views to share certain features, namely: 
19 For extended di scu~sions of variations in feminist thought, see, for 
example, JOSEPHINE DO~OVAN, FEMINI T TH EORY: THE lNTELLECfUAL 
TRADITIONS or: AMERICAN FtMINISM ( 1985); ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST 
POUTICS A\!D HUMAN N.<\TURE ( 1983); ROSEMARlE TONG , F EMINIST THOUGHT: 
A COMPREHENSIV E I NTRODUCTION ( 1989). 
2
'' For an account of the problems with both essentialist and antiessentialist, 
or nominalist, feminisms, see Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus Post-
St1'11cwralism: The fd~ntily Crisis in Feminist Themy, 13 SIGNS 405 ( 1988) 
(attempting to avoid ·lhese problems in a theory that rejects a commitment to 
essentialism but allows that, in fact, women as a class have a gendl!rcd identity 
that leads to certain characteiistica1!y ' 'women's needs" in the present world). 
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(1) a recognition that women as a group have been and remain in a 
subordinate position in relation to men; 
(2) an account of the source(s) of that subordination; and 
(3) suggestions for how the subordmation of women can be over-
come.21 
Recent feminist approaches, particularly in the work of women of 
color, frequently mclude: 
( 4) an account of the ways tn which women have resisted oppres-
. ? ? s10n. -· 
It is also the case that contemporary femimst approaches are almost 
invariably: 
(5) acutely aware that social subordination is not limited to women, 
and 
(6) deeply committed to the elimination of centrisms that systemati-
cally place members of one group in a position of lesser value than 
persons of other groups (centrisms such as sexism, racism, heterosexism, 
regionalism, classism, ageism, and ableism). 
It is also common for contemporary feminists to: 
(7) understand these systems of subordination and oppression as 
inteilocking in the sense that one cannot hope for the elimination of one 
without accomplishing the elimination of others. 
These, then, are the features we take to be essentially (1 -3) and 
commonly ( 4-7) associated with a feminist consciousness or perspective 
in any domain. 
"Liberal feminists" were the first to recognize women as a sexual 
class, that is, to recognize women as in a collective position in relation 
to men. As Zillah Eisenstein points out: "Liberal feminism is not 
feminism merely added to liberalism. Rather, rhere is a real difference 
belween liberalism and liberal feminism in t.hat feminism requires a 
recognition, however implicit and undefined, of the sexual-class 
ident i tication of women as women. "23 Li.beral feminism is so called 
1 1 Alison M. Jaggar, Femini~·t Ethics, in E:-!CYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 36 1 
(Laurence C. Becker & Chai·l ot!~ 8. Becker eds., 1992); cf .ROSEMARIE TONG, 
F'EMINJNE AND FEMINIST ETHICS I 0- l ! ( 1993) (explaimng Alison Jaggar's view 
that a femm1st approach to ethtcs see;<s to: "1. arttculatc moral crit1ques of 
~ct ions and pract1ces that perptetuatc:women's subordination; 2. prescribe morally 
j ustifiable ways of resisting such actions and practices; and 3. envision morally 
desirable alternatives that wi li promote women's emancipation''). 
22 See, e.g., PATRICIA H. COLLINS, BLACK FEMlNIST T HOUGHT: KNOWL-
EDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND ·1 HE POLITICS OF POWER I 1991). 
23 ZILLA I I R. ElSE~lSTETN, 'Tllf RADICAL Fr.JTURE Of liBc.:Ra.r_ FEMINISM 6 
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because it at once shares the essential commitments that bind characteris-
tically feminist views (i.e., minimally, features 1-3 above), while also 
sharing the fundamental ontological and n01mative commitments of 
liberalism - commitments that "postliberal feminists" have rejected. For 
example, like liberals simpliciter, liberal fem inists assume that persons are 
radically individualized autonomous agents, that the uniqueness of human 
beings is located in the capacity for rationality and autonomy, and that 
the protection of individual autonomy is the keystone of a morally well-
ordered society. The ontological and axiological commitment to 
individual autonomy that informs liberalism and liberal feminism tends 
to issue in a morality of rights. In addition to being the source of later 
femini sms,24 the great contribution of liberal feminism has been its 
insistence that a political system that protects the interests of men but not 
of women will not bear moral scrutmy. 
D. Postliberal Feminisms and the Feminist Social Justice Approach 
Common to postliberaJ feminist positions is the rejection of the liberal 
ontology of the person as we have sketched it, and, with it, the liberal's 
extreme emphasis on individual liberty to the exclusion of values such as 
the nurturing of individuals and communities, the sustaining of relation-
ships, the relief of suffering, and attention to appropriate substantive 
equality. ln rejecting liberal feminism, postliberal femini sts contend that 
liberal feminism has committed itself to a morality which emphasizes 
separation between persons rather than the connections and interdepen-
dencies bet\;veen persons.25 ln other words, the charge is that liberal 
feminists have, with liberals, committed themselves to what Alison Jaggar 
calls "no1111ativc dualism"20 and "political solipsism:m These commit-
ments together lead to "political skepticism"23 and, hence, the liberal's 
( 1981 ). 
14 See EISENSTEIN, supra note 23. 
25 See JAGGAR, supra note 19. 
26 Nonnative dualism is the view that what is especially valuable about 
human beings is their ''mental" capacity for rationality. !d. 
27 Political soli psism is the view that hu111an beings are essentially solitary 
or isolated, self-sufficient entities, with intere:;ts and needs essentia lly ditlerent 
and separate from, and often in opposition to, those of others. Jd. 
28 Political skepticism is the view that questions pertaining to the well·being 
of individuals can have no common answers. !d. 
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placing an inordinate premium on the liberty of this rational , autonomous, 
solitary person to be and do what he or she destres.2!1 
Postliberal feminists join in departing from the liberal's and liberal 
feminist's commitment to this atom iStic v1ew of persons and tend to insist 
that persons ''arrive" in the world already mcxtricably imbedded in webs 
of relationships- in social contexts that in gTeat pan detennine who they 
are and what they will become as individuals, as well as where their 
responsibilities will lie. The rejection here is of what is known as 
"abstract individualism,"30 which treats persons for the purposes of 
political theory as individuals abstracted out of all social contexts. This 
abstraction is a familiar theme in the works of John Locke, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and other 
liberal moral and political theorists, but it fails to describe real persons. 
Rather, postliberal feminists conceive of persons more like knots in a net 
than li ke discrete balls that might be contained in a net- there is no knot 
in a net without coru1ections to other knots. 
This is the ontology of persons that the postliberal feminist position 
shares with communitarianism. But this feminist position is not directly 
subject to the central moral objection that liberals commonly bring 
again · t communitarians. namely, that they reject individual libe11y as a 
central moral value. When the posll iberal feminist challenges abstract 
individualism and the concept of autonomy as they work in liberal theory, 
she is concerned not to totally disregard the moral importance of 
individual libe1ty, but to direct attention to thi.! real lives of real women 
with all the substantial impingements on liberty that characterize those 
lives. She wants to lay bare the social realities of women's lives that 
expose as mythology the doctrine of full autonomy upon which liberal 
theory rests. She wants society to see that characteristically male li ves (in 
United States soc1ety, particularly economically privi leged, white male 
lives) tend tO fit the ontological assumptions of liberalism far better than 
characteristi c<lliy female live:; (particularly the lives of working class and 
poor non-white women). If we look carefully at our major social 
institutions and the social positiOns w '"'·hich the most substantial oc1al, 
political, and economic benefits attach. we shall find (virtually invan ably) 
that they are structured by men, that their standards tor success and 
19 JAGGAR, s11pra note 19, at 40--+2; see also T ONG, supra note 21 at 35. 
30 Naomi Scheman, !ndi,·iduolism and r/lc Objects of Psychology, in 
DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPFCTIVES ON EPISTFMOt..OGY, lVf.E'I A PHYS-
ICS, M ETHODOLOGY. AND THE Pli!I.OSOPIIY OF SC I E~CE. 225 (Sandra Harding & 
Me1Till B. Hintikka ed, ., 1983). 
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reward in one way or another promote dominance and competition as 
fundamental values, and that those standards for success and reward often 
presume as the nonn and best suit the realities of life for (particularly 
relatively privileged, white) men.31 
For example, the expectations of the professional in the contemporary 
university, the contemporary corporation, or the professions of law and 
medicine are typically set by men and most easily met by men - men 
who are fi·ee to concentrate on their professional lives, often (indeed, 
usually) with women in the background to manage their households and 
serve as primary care providers for their children.32 Privileged men have 
been the generators of liberalism and its individualistic ontology of 
persons. It cannot seriously be considered coincidental that men, who are 
so often most free to function autonomously (that is, relatively unim-
paired by the requirements of households, children, and community) are 
also the primary creators and administrators of contemporary institutions 
that encourage an emphasis on extreme mdividualism, productivity, and 
competition between persons rather than an emphasis on community, 
nurturing, and connectedness between persons - an emphasis that is 
common - indeed, generally necessary - in characteristically female 
lives.33 
These are among the hidden din1ensions and implications of 
liberalism that the postliberal feminist seeks to reveal. Her purpose is to 
show that moral considerations other than just individual liberty should 
command our uncompromising allegiance. This is because the focus on 
individual liberty in liberalism, from its .inception, detracts from concern 
for recognizing the basic moral equality of all persons by favoring those 
3 1 No claims about essentialism are presumed here. The point is just that 
men's lives commonly have certain charactei'istics, women's lives commonly 
have certain characLeristics, and that these common characteristics are not the 
same for men and women. This poinl is compatible with essentialism, nominal-
ism, and positionalism. For a number of views on sexual difference, see 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL D IFFERENCE (Deborah L. Rhode ed. , 
1990). For a discussion of difference more generally1 see MARTHA MtNOW, 
MAKfNG ALL Tl IE D IFFERENCE: I NCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 
(l990). 
32 This is an example of what we mean hy a feature common to "character-
istically male lives'' - men commonly have spou:.es who bear primary 
responsibility for hou!)eholds and child care; women commonly do .not. 
33 For just one discussion of how the features of characteristically male 
lives press aw~ty from nurturina, -::ommunity, a11d connectedness, see Annette 
Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 23 1 (1986). 
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whose lives best match the liberal ontology of persons. Concerned about 
individual liberty, then, the postlibera! femimst is also concerned about 
individual welfare and about the dismantling of systems that serve the 
welfare of some while ignoring the welfare, substantive freedom, and 
equitable treatment of others. The notion of respect for persons that so 
deeply infonns liberal theory is construed more broadly on these accounts 
- respecting another person is not just limited to leaving her alone; 
respecting another person involves attending to the conditions that are 
necessary for her thriving. And it also means seeing that she has equally 
available to her the basic conditions of meaningful self-direction. On 
these accounts, then, liberalism's emphasis on individual liberty and, in 
particular, its conceptualization of individual liberty as negative liberty or 
noninterference, leads to the creation and continuation of social and 
political structures that do not take seriously enough the moral equality 
of all persons, regardless of their social location. 
E. Liberalism as a Conservative Social and Political Theo1y 
It is important to emphasize that feminists who reject liberalism as 
inadequate to address important questions of equity, need not fail to see 
the crucial contributions of liberal theory as it emerged in the West. 
Liberal ism, compared to the systems agrunst which it developed in 
reaction (feudalism, absolutism, aristocracy, and traditional patriarchy), 
is an enormous moral achievement, and feminists genera lly recognize 
this. The problem is that liberal ism has exhausted its progressive 
potential. An alternative social and political theory needs to be developed 
to address the substantive quesnons of maldistribution of power among 
moral equals, an tssue which liberaltsm has been unable to address.34 
Though once progresstvc because of its msistence on greater freedom and 
inclusion, liberalism today is conservative m the sense that it preserves 
the selective inclusion with which liberalism began, leaving intact systems 
that continue to subordinate some groups to others. 
11. CONCERNS ABOUT HARM 
It is a feature of traditional liberal rhetoric that the only ground on 
which the state might interfere with the liberty of individuals is to prevent 
3~ See, e.g., ELIZABETH fRAZER & NICOLA LACEY, TilE POLITICS OF 
COMMUNITY: A f EMINIST CRITIQUE OF TilE LIBERAL-COio .. IML'NITARIAI\' DEBATE 
ch. 3 (1993). 
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hann. The classic statement of this view, of course, 1s tn John Stuart 
Mill 's On Liberty.35 Although Mill is a Utilitarian and Locke is a rights-
based theorist, Utilitarians such as Mill share with Lockeans an atomistic 
ontology of persons. In Mill 's theory, this ontology is combined with a 
psychology that leads to the claim that happines must be the fundamental 
ground of morality, and the general happiness the fundamental ground of 
the just state. According to Mill, in order fo r this to be achieved, people 
must be left as free as possible. 36 Stated in other terms, this view 
requires that individuals not be interfered with except to prevent 
(unjustifiabl.e) harm to others. 
This tenet of liberal theory informs one objection that has been raised 
against a feminist social justice approach to reproduction-assisting 
technologies. The most thorough treatment to date of the liberal position 
on these technologies ha. been offered by John Robertson.37 An 
objection he brings against feminist social justice approaches is that the 
ham1s that feminists argue are associated with reproduction-assisting 
technologies are merely symboltc - they are not real, tangible harms. 
Thus, for example, Robertson says femmist concerns that contract 
motherhood arrangements commodify women and children amount to no 
more than ··a perception of the symbolic effects of treating gestation as 
)
5 JOHNS. M ILL, On Liberty , in UTILJT;\RIANISl'vl A?\0 0TIIER W RITINGS 126 
(Mary Warnock cd., 1974) ( 1859). 
36 See JOHNS. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 37-4 1 (Samuel Gorovitz ed., 197 1) 
( 1861 ), wh~rc he argues that human beings are constructed psychologica lly so 
that the only thing we can rccogn izl.! as intrinsically good is happiness. Since we 
cannot recognize anything else as being good in itself, and since ·'ought" implies 
'·can," the on ly reasonable ground for morali ty is the production of happiness. 
By parity of reasoning, the only j ustification for state authority is the production 
of happiness. Since everyone counts as one and no more than one, and since the 
community/citizenry is no more th;.ln tht! sum of its parts, the state should select 
that set of rules and practices (including that set of laws) which will tend to 
produce the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number. Mill also holds 
that each individual wi ll (in general) be the best judge of his or her own interest 
and happim:ss. Thus, people should be left tl·ee to govem their own lives, and 
should be limi ted only to prevent them from ham1ing others. For Mill , too, then, 
atomistic inJividualism leads to a political theory that emphasizes individual 
liberty. Liberalism as we understand it here, and a· it is commonly understood 
in po litical theory. includes both rights-based th~orists such as Locke and goal-
based theorists such as Mil l. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. 
JJ ROBERTSON. Sllp!"Ci nolc 8. 
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a product to be sold for money. "38 There are at least three problems 
lurking in this logical woodpile. 
A. Harm as the Only lVforally Relevant Concern 
The first problem with liberal arguments such as Robertson's is that 
they presume, without argument, that interferences with individual liberty 
can only be justified if they are undertaken to prevent harm to others. 
This is certainly what Mill explicitly committed himself to in On Liberty 
when he said that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is 
to prevent hann to others. "39 But political theorists know that Mill 
himself departed from this "one very simple principle,"~0 even within 
On Liberty. 
Even if Mill had not so departed from the harm principle. moral 
agents in contemporary society simply do not accept the ham1 principle. 
That is, the prevention of harm does not constitute the only justification 
for any interference with individual liberty. Consider, for example, 
mandatory education, mandatory payment into social security, or property 
laws that disallow someone's use of another's property, even though that 
use would not in any way hann the owner (e.g .. a homeless person's 
sleeping during winter in someone's unoccupied summer cottage, perhaps 
leaving it in better condition than she found it). Society allows all sorts 
of interferences with individual liberty for reasons other than the 
prevention of harm; in particular, restraints on liberty are allowed for 
reasons having to do with the public good and the protection of rights, 
irrespective of considerations of ha.nn. Therefore, liberals cannot simply 
presume that the prevention of hann is the only reason that could justify 
restricting the development, application, and/or acceptance of reproduc-
tion-assisting technologJes:11 There may be other sound policy reasons 
-------------------------------------------------------
38 /d. at 141. Liberal feminist law professor Lo1i Andrews m::tkes a similar 
claim regarding a number of the arguments that feminists have used to argue for 
the moral unacceptability of commercial so-called surrogate mother arrange-
ments. See Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: 7'he Challenge for 
Feminists , in SURROGi\TF. MC)TifF.R/1000: POUTlCS t\ND PRIVACY 167, 17 1 ~78 
(Larry Gostin ed., 1990). 
39 Mi ll, s11pra note 35, at \35. 
40 Jd. 
41 Liberals do not take this rhetoric to heart, either; Robertson himself 
disallows certain uses of reproductive technologies for what he would have to 
term ''symbol ic" reasons. ROB!: R 1 SON, Sttpra note 8. 
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for introducing some restrictions on these practices. That much said, 
however, it needs to be pointed out that feminist social justice proponents 
generally are not subject to the objection that they support interference 
with individual liberty in most of these matters. 
B. Interfering with Liberty: A Bright Red Herring 
Liberals such as Robertson make the (unacceptable) claim that only 
prevention of harm can justify interference with individual liberty.42 But 
more often than not, feminists simply are not arguing for interference 
with individual liberty. Virtually all existing vers ions of a feminist social 
justice approach would allow access to anyone desiring to use reproduc-
tion-assisting technologies. Much of the feminist discussion on reproduc-
tion-assisting technologies can be understood as engagement in moral 
suasion. Even though many femimsts disagree with the development and 
deployment of reproduction-aSsisting technologies, ranging from IVF to 
contract motherhood, tew argue that it should be illegal for individuals 
to develop, apply, and/or personally usc these methodologies. Tn general, 
the objection that femi nist social j ustice theonsts are calling lor severe 
interferences wjth reproducttve liberty attacks a "straw man.'' Although 
a number of postliberal feminists have argued for a prohibition on 
brokering commercial surrogacy contracts and for the courts' refusal to 
enforce these contracts,~3 the argument for prohibition of brokering 
commercial surrogacy contracts is a far cry from the claim that all such 
arrangements should be absolutely prohibited by law, which would make 
individual parties who set up nonenforceable forms of these arrangements 
liable to legal sanction. No feminist that we have read has supponcd this 
position. To argue that the development and deployment of these 
tecllnologies arc harmtld to women and children (which feminists have 
frequently argued and which we shall argue in a moment) is not 
equivalent to arguing that the development, application, or use of any of 
these methodologies should be prohibited by law. Discussions, such as 
Robertson 's,+' that present the position of femin ist social j ustice theorists 
this way grossly misrepresent most versions of this kind of position. 
4~ See s11pra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
4
l See, e.g., 0VERJ\LL. supra note 9: CHRISTINE OVERALL, ETHICS AND 
H UMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 11 )-36 ( 19H7); Margaret Radin, 
Marker Inalienability, IOU H:'\RV. L. REv. 1349, 192 1-36 ( 1987). 
'
4 See supra notr::s 39-4 1 and accompanying text. 
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C. Symbolic Versus Tangible Harms 
The final problem with the liberal position on the matter of hann is 
that it characterizes the hanns of concern to feminist social justice 
theorists as merely symbolic. First, by characterizing the harms at issue 
as "symbolic," liberals try to do away with a problem by manipulating 
the label for it. "Symbolic" harms, by definition, are not real hanns. But 
the hanns that concern feminist social justice theorists are very real. That 
they are often insidious makes them no tess tangible. 
The harms that concern feminist social justice theorists are those that 
result from deeply entrenched, continuing social centrisms, such as 
racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, heterosexism, classism, ableism, an.d 
ageism. Who could reasonably deny that in a society where women still 
do not receive pay equal to men's for the same work,45 women are not 
harmed by institutions and practices that contribute to their subordinate 
position to men? Who could reasonably deny that people of color are 
hanned by their systemic exclusion from the social, political, and 
economic mainstream? Who could reasonably deny that when our public 
spaces are inaccessible to those who are not of "normal" ability that such 
people are deprived of important goods available to the rest of us - that 
is, they are harmed? Who could reasonably deny that gay men and · 
lesbians are harmed by social systems that refi.tse to assure them the same 
protections and benefits that are provided for heterosexuals? That we 
cannot say in advance what precise individual wi ll suffer what precise 
harm is not a reason to deny that the hanns in question are real harms. 
Women are ham1ed by attitudes, institutions, and practices that serve 
to keep women in a position subordinate to the position of men. Insofar 
as reproductiOn-assisting technologies contribute to the subordinate 
position of women, they are harmful. There is nothing symbolic about 
that. Feminists have extensively argued that reproduction-assisting 
technologies do conttibute tO the subordination of women by continuing 
to tie the value of women to rC}XOduction. The !JOint 15 that if a systern 
serves to privilege members ot some groups over members of others, the 
system hanns those in the subordmate groups. Because reproductiOn-
assisting technologies contribute to the pnvilegmg of some over others, 
then they are harmful. And the concrete ha1ms associated with subordi-
nation of groups in our society are substantial. Therefore, even if it were 
the case that prevention of harm alone could justify restrictions on 
"'
5 Grac,~ Schneider, Women to Raise Financial Fists {or Equal Pay, 
COURIER~JOURNJ\L (Louisvi it c), Oct. 29, 1995, at 8 l. 
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individual liberty, feminist social justice theorists have (and have used) 
an argument based on tangible harm to deploy against the development, 
application, and personal use of reproduction-assisting technologies. 
Indeed, the moral centerpiece of feminist social justice approaches to 
reproduction-assisting technologies is that these technologies privilege 
some (namely, well-off white men) over others, and that they are, 
therefore, harmful in virttte of this contribution to a system of social 
subordination. 
D. Conternporary Liberalistn as a Deontological Theory 
There is a final point which needs to be made about the liberal 
objection that feminist social justice theorists are concerned only about 
symbolic hanns. This view is sometimes expressed as a complaint about 
"deontological ... reverence," to use the words of John Robertson. 46 
This is a strange objection, however, coming from a rights-based liberal 
theorist such as Robertson. Robertson 's own liberal v1ew begins with a 
rock-bottom commitment to strong moral nghts, especially the right of 
individuals to be at liberty. In making moral rights foundational to 
morality and the construction of a just soctety, contemporary liberals 
follow Locke rather than Mill, who espoused a goal-based view of 
rights.41 Robertson's approach to rights fo llows that put forward by 
Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin asserts that basic moral rights have priority 
over ends-based considerations. Thus, Dworkin holds that whenever 
moral rights come into play, they "tmmp'' other considerat ions.48 This 
is precisely the language Robertson uses throughout his discussions of 
reproductive liberty; but such a view is paradigmatically deontological. 
Deontological views are conceptually opposed to teleological views . 
The deontologist denies the tcleologist's claim that consequences (real or 
probable) are the whole ofthe moral story. Some deontologists (Kant, for 
example) hold that consequences never aftect the moral value or disvaluc 
·'
6 John A. Robertson, The Rightne.)·s of Rights Analysis: A Response 10 
Dorothy Roberr.1·, 20 L. & Soc. iNQUIRY I 023, 1027 (1995). 
~7 Lockean liberalism JS <.~rights-based view; that is, this fonn of liberalism 
takes strong moral rights to be foundmional. Millean liberalism, on the other 
hand, is a goal-based view: it recognizes rights only insofar as they are thought 
to maximize the general good. Thus, ti·om Mi ll ' 'i Utilitarian viewpoint, rights are 
not foundational - they arc derivativ..: from uti lity. This makes for crucial 
differences in these classical lib.;ral view$. Most contemporary liberals are of the 
rights-based variety. 
-Ill See. e.g., RONALD DWORK!'J, TAI<JNG R tGHTS SERlOUSL 'r' 259~65 ( 1978). 
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of an action (or practice). Others admit consequences as morally relevant 
considerations; they just deny that consequences alone mvanably 
determine the nghtness or wrongness of actiOnS and/or practtces. And so 
it is that rights-based moral theonsts are deontologists, smce they hold 
that rights, rather than consequences, sit at the foundattons of morality 
and must sit at the foundations of a JUSt society. Feminist social justice 
theorists are concerned that social and political systems take seriously the 
moral equality of persons. Such concerns are, by their very nature, 
deontological. But that is no criticism of them, particularly from a rights-
based perspective. To place the liberty of individuals at the foundations 
of morality and the just state is equally dcontological; and so complaints 
about "deontological reverences" are applicable (if they are applicable at 
all) to rights-based liberal views, such as Robertson's itself. 
Our general points on the matter of harm, then, are these: (l) 
considerations other than harm should command our moral allegiance and 
may justify interference with individuallibcny; (2) fem inist social justice 
theorists generally do not argue for interference with individual liberty as 
regards reproduction-assisting technologies, except in the case of 
brokering contract mother arrangements, which a number of feminists 
have argued should not be lawful; and (3) individuals suffer very real and 
substantial harms by being in socially subordinate positions; thus any' 
practices that contribute to the subordination of some groups by others 
are harmful. Since reproduction-assisting technologies contri bute to a 
system of social subordination they are harmful. 
111. THE M YTH OF LIBERAL NEUTRALITY 
AND THE MA T'!'hR OF H/\R..\-1 REVISITED 
A. The Charge of Legal lvforalism 
Liberals also object to a feminist social justice approach on the 
ground that it is a form of legal moralism. The rhetoric of liberal political 
theory requires that the governJnent rematn neutral among competing 
conceptions of morality to protect ci ti zen'' against the impositiOn of state 
orthodoxy. Liberals therefore try ro "set aside or 'bracket' controversial 
moral and religious conceptions few purposes of J U~tice. ,~y The liberal 
notion of procre3tlve liberty allows .ach Individual to choose her own 
moral understanding of procrr!ntlon for hcr·lelC so long as she causes no 
~9 Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argwnent and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and 
f-lomosexuality, 77 C AL. L. RF.V. 521 , 521 ( 1989). 
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harm to others. The United States Supreme Court applies this approach 
to questions of reproductive rights, defending the right to an abortion as 
an aspect of "fi·eedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life 
" 50 
Under this view, a feminist social justice approach to assisted 
reproduction improperly reflects a particular moral view about reproduc-
tion which individuals in a pluralistic society should remain free to reject. 
Liberals understand the fem inist concern that contract pregnancy 
arrangements devalue women's role in reproduction, for example, as a 
moral position that is entitled to no more government deference than the 
moral position that these arrangements further women's autonomy. As 
Robertson explains, "reasonable people have different moral perceptions 
about paid surrogacy, with many not finding the symbolic demeaning of 
motherhood that others see as so glaringly wrong."51 By asking the 
government to choose between these competing moral views, liberals 
argue, feminists violate the neutrality requirement. 
Liberals, of course, must demonstrate that their notion of procreative 
freedom does not rely on similar moral judgments. This is attempted by 
trying to distinguish between personal conceptions of morality that are 
irrelevant to government decisionmak:ing and tangible hanns to individu-
als, which may properly be weighed against procreative interests. This 
distinction, however, cannot withstand careful scrutiny, for liberal 
defenses of procreative liberty reduce to a moral position about the value 
of procreation. 
The primacy liberals accord procn.:ation, based panly on the 
importance to personal identity of genetic transmission, reflects a 
panicular and contested view of reproduction. Liberals contend that 
procreative liberty deserves privileged status because of its importance to 
personal conceptions of identity and the meaning of life. ln what sense 
is the decision to procreatr.:; central to personal identity? Answering this 
question involves moral .iudgments about the meaning aml importance of 
reproduction. 
In responding for liberals, Robertson centers on the human desire for 
genetic connection with offspring. Although he concedes tbat th is desire 
is at least partly socially constmcted, Robertson explains it in biological 
terms: ''(A]t the most basit: level transmission of one's genes through 
reproduction is an animal or species urge closely linked to the sex 
50 Doe v. Bolton, 41 0 U.S. 179,211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
51 ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 141. 
I 995-96] A FEMINIST SOCIAL JUSTJCE APPROACII 1215 
drive."52 But, of course, the fact that animals have a natural urge to have 
sex in no way whatever entails that they have a natural urge to transmit 
their genes. Robertson's claim here 1s an example of what used to be 
called "anthropomorphism/' and is now known as an example of "the 
social construction of biology." 
Further, this belief in the importance of genetic destiny to personal 
identity seems to contradict the liberal 1mage of the autonomous, self-
choosing individual. An examination of the role the genetic tie plays in 
defining personal identity, creating children, and detennining legal 
parentage demonstrates the sttiking indeterminacy of its legal and social 
meaning.53 The importance of genetic relatedness is not determined by 
biology, but by culture. Even within our legal system, its meaning varies 
depending on the context. Although we generally assume that the genetic 
tie creates an enduring bond between parents and their chi ldren, the law 
often disregards it, for example, in the cases of contract mothers, sperm 
donors, and unwed fathers.54 
A comparison of liberals' defense of procreative choices and 
feminists' identification of ham1s reveals a striking similarity in their 
moral explanations of the significance of procreation. Consider, fo r 
example, Robertson's refutation of Margaret Radin 's argument that paid 
pregnancy arrangements commodify women and chi ldrcn.55 Radin 
contends that childbearing should not be traded on the market because 
"commodification of women's reproductive capaci ty is ham1ful for the 
identity aspect of personhood and . . . the closeness of paid surrogacy to 
baby·selling harms our self-conception too deeply."56 Robe1ison 
criticizes Radin for failing to show why payment for gestation is 
52 !d. at 24. Robertson posits as the moti vation lor couples' use of infertility 
treatment, for example, the frustration of ''their normal species urge to 
procreate." !d. at 98. 
53 Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209. 2 10 
( 1995). For another argument contesting the understanding of parenthood based 
on genetic relatedness, see ELIZABETH BARTIIOLET, FAMlLY BONDS: A DOPTION 
AND TilE POLITICS OF PA REN1'1NG ( J 993); R EPRODUCTI VE TECHNOLOGIES: 
G ENDER, M OTHERHOOD AND MEDICINe (iV1ichelle Stanworth ed. , 1987). 
54 ln custody disputes, courts typically discount the centrad mother's 
genetic claim to legal matcmity and the unwed father's genetic claim to lega l 
paternity in cases where the child's mother ss marrkd ta another mG~n. fn most 
states, the sperm donor is not cousidered the legal fath~r of his genetic of!'!:!pring. 
ss See Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice, Procreativf.! Liberty. and the 
Limits of Liberal Theo;y: Robenson's Children of Choice, 20 L. & Soc. INQU IRY 
1005, 1010-J 1 (1995)-
s6 See Radin, s11pra note 43, at 1932. 
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particularly objectionable "since one could just as reasonably argue that 
the physical and mental attributes that drive the market for models~ 
professional athletes, and computer scientists are also essential to •our 
deepest understanding of what it i. to be human.' "57 Yet Robertson 
himself rests his defense of paid pregnancy on the view that "procreative 
liberty should enjoy presumptive primacy . . . because control over 
whether one reproduces or not is central to personal identity, to dignity, 
and to the meaning of one's life.''5 ~ Although Radin and Robertson 
reach opposite conclusions about the implications of reproduction's 
importance, they both ultimately rely on a similarly normative conception 
of procreation. 
Liberals' contention that their concept of procreation does not serve 
to limit the reproductive choices of some individuals (as the feminist 
social justice approach purportedly does) is also erroneous. Despite their 
rhetoric, most liberals would probably concede that there must be some 
limits to the use of reproductiOn-assisting technologies, even in the 
absence of a showing of tangible harm to another individual. For 
example, should procreative libeny pcnnit a parent to clone her offspring, 
creating an exact genetiC repl ica of another human genome?· The only 
way to restrict such pract1ces is to reson to some morali tic judgment 
about the proper use of these technologies. Thus, Robertson posits "a core 
view of the goals and values of reproduction" that encompasses only 
"actions designed to enable a couple to have normal, healthy offspring 
whom they intend to rear."59 Robertson, therefore, opposes cloning and 
the use of prenatal genetic screening to produce a disabled child.60 
Procreative liberty does not protect these insidiou · forms of selection of 
offspring characteristics, according to Robertson, because they '"pass 
beyond the central experiences of identity and meaning that make 
reproduction a valued experience."61 But liberals' own argument from 
their core understanding of reproduction rests on a fundamental moral 
position about the proper role of reproduction. 
ln sho11, liberals such as Rob;:rtson rely on conceptions of reproduc-
tion to outweigh indi vidua13' interest in personal choice that are no less 
57 ROBER"! SON, supra note l'S, at 142. 
ss !d. at 24. 
sn !d. at 167. 
60 !d. at 17 1 (Robertson refers to the usc of genetic testing to produce a 
disabled child as " intentional diminif:hment." As an example of intentional 
diminishment, Robertson off:!rs a set of hypothdical deaf parents who wish to 
usc genetic screening to t!nsure that their child will also be deaf. ). 
IJI !d. at i 69. 
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''moralistic" than feminist social justice approaches. Recognizing the 
impossibility of avoiding these moral questions demolishes liberals' 
repudiation of feminist criticism of unlimited procreative liberty on the 
ground that it reflects a moral perspective. 
B. Liberal Inequality 
Moreover, liberals' exclusion of social justice concerns on the ground 
that they constitute legal moralism does not promote government 
neutrality as liberals claim. Liberals defend the bracketing of moral 
arguments as a prerequisite for neutral government decisionmaking with 
respect to individuals' personal choices. But liberalism in practice tends 
to favor the choices of the privileged and to maintain current distributions 
of wealth and power. This bias is reflected, for example, in liberals' 
resolution of disputes between couples and birth mothers who have 
entered into paid pregnancy contracts. \Vhen a birth mother decides she 
does not wish to relinquish her child, both sides have procreative interests 
at stake. But liberals insist on the enlistment of the gove1nment's 
affirmative assistance in enforcing paid pregnancy contracts to protect the 
wealthier and more powerful contracting man's interest in having a 
genetically-related child. Thus, enforc ing these contracts would estabJish 
in advance of any particular case the state's unequivocal preference for 
the reproductive interests of contracting men over contracted women.(i2 
Further, courts in our existing liberal society are far more li kely to 
recognize the rights of married couples to use reproduction-assisting 
technologies to create or compl!!te nuclear famil ies than to uphold their 
use by single heterosexual women, lesbians, or gay men."3 The dispro-
potiionate use of these technologies by whire people, despite higher 
infertility rates among people of color, suggests as well the probability of 
racial bi as in fertility and genetic counselling.64 
61 See. e.g., Joan C. Callah;;m, Pmr.:reative Liherty: Whose Reprodt~ction ? 
Whose Liberty ?, 6 STJ\1\'. L. & POL' Y REV. 121, 121-25 (1995). 
63 See. e.g., MAtnHA 1\. f iELD, SURROC.iAT;-: MOTHERHOOD 116-21 ( 1988); 
Joan C. Callahan, The Contract Morherhoorl Debate, 4 J. CUNlCAL ETHICS 82 
( 1 993)~ Roberts, The Genetic Tie, ,\'upra note .53, at 252-57; Carol Smart "There 
fs of Co11rse the Distinct foil Dictated by Nmure '': Law and the Problem of 
Paternity, in R EPRODUCTIVE T ECH!\OLOG!ES : GE~DER, M OTHERHOOD AND 
M EDICINE 98 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1. 987). 
64 Patricia A. K ing1 The Past as Prologue: Race, Class and Gene Discrimi-
natiofl , in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GUIDES 94, I 03 {George 
J, Annas & Shennan Elias cds., 1992) (suggl!sting that the racial dispari ty in the 
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The choices of the poor and people of color (and, particularly, 
women in these groups), on the other hand, often remain unfulfilled or 
even overridden under liberal notions of procreative liberty. Liberal 
theory offers no support to people who cannot afford the cost of 
reproductive health services. Nor does liberal theory necessarily recognize 
as state intrusion conditions placed on government benefits to poor 
women that restrict their reproductive decisions. Liberal theory leaves 
market biases to operate freely against Jess powerful groups because these 
forces do not constitute state interference with procreative choices. Thus, 
in the case of abortion, liberal theory, with its noninterference interpreta-
tion of liberty, can (and does) allow the state to refuse to make abortion 
services available to all women who need those services to safely exercise 
their choice not to reproduce. The liberals' formal t!nderstanding of 
political freedom as noninterference with seeking an abortion is a 
virtually meaningless freedom for a woman who cannot afford to 
purchase a safe procedure. In just this sort of way, liberal theory protects 
the interests of the economically pnvileged while ignoring meaningful 
freedom for the least well off. 
C. Harrn Revisited 
Having established that liberals' core view of reproduction has no 
presumptive advantage over one that takes into account social justice 
concerns, we may turn again to tbe harms that are at the center of 
feminist concerns. A feminist social JUStice approach understands the 
value of procreation and the ham1s stemming from reproduction-assisting 
technologies in their social sunoundings. Such an approach recognizes 
that it is impossible to comprehend the welfare of ind ividual ~ apart from 
the context of their social positions. This perspective contrasts markedly 
with the liberal presumption that individl1als' procrt!ative choices may be 
isolated from unjust social structuces. inJh iduals ore not atomistic beings 
who create their identi ties, m~ke choices, and detcnnine their interests 
apart from their rspecitic communities .:~nd general social locations. An 
individual's ability to make. autonomous decisions is circumscribed by the 
use of clinical genetic services may bt relat~d to physician referra ls); Laulie 
Nsiah-Jefferson & Elaine l H<1ll. Reproduetive Technology: Perspectives and 
implications /Dr Low-1ncorm: Women and Women of Color, in HEALING 
TECHNOLOGY: FEMINiS l' ?FRSPECTIVES 9.3. 95-102, 109-ll (Kathryn S. Ratcli ff 
et al. eds., 1989) (discussing baniers that re·,ttict access by poor women and 
women of color to genetic c')tmselling and rtproduction-a~sisting technologies). 
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material conditions of her life, including her social position and group 
membership; her social location helps to determine her life prospects. 
Membership in a dominant group affords an automatic privilege, while 
membership in a subordinate group materially hatms people.l" The harm 
of membership in a subordinate group is manifested in countless ways 
and reflected in a myriad of statistics. The infelior social position of 
women, generally, and black women, in particular, exemplify the harm 
caused by unjust social strucntres. 
Women experience more poveny and v1olence in their homes than 
men because of their gender. A Jaber market and system of child care 
structured against working mothers 1eads to increasingly high rates of 
female poverty.66 The proportion of poor white families maintained by 
women rose from twenty percent in 19.59 to forty-two percent in 1987.67 
Over one-half of black families head~d by women live in poverty; and 
black families he3ded by women are three times as likely to be poor or 
near poor than those with an adult male present.6R Experts estimate that 
half of all manied women will bl! beaten by their husbands at some point 
in their mardage. 69 Between fifteen and forty percent of all women are 
victims of attempted or completed rap~s, most committed by acquaintanc-
es. 70 \Vho could reasonably Jeny that ihese are real, tangible harms? 
Consider homosexual people as a subordinated group. Gay men and 
lesbians are increasingly victims of hate crimes, perpetrated by straight 
white men." lt is currently .:hought that thirty percent of gay male and 
lesbian teenagers attempt suicide, with their sexual orientation a major 
65 See Cheryl i. Harris, "?Vhiten~ss a.; P1operty, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 
(1993) (discussing the concept of whiten~ss as a form 1J f property that brings 
with it benefits and privileges ratified by law). 
~6 See generally MARTHA F INEMAN, THE NF.UTF.RC:O MOTHER, THE SEXUAL 
FAMILY AND OTHER T WE:-IT!ETH CE:,ITURY TkN!E.DlES ( 1995). 
67 Audrey Rowe, The Femimzallon of Pm·erty: An issue fm· the 90 's, 4 
YALE J.L. & fEMINISM 73, 74 (199 1 ). 
bS Margaret C. Simms, Black Women Who Head Families: An Economic 
Stntggle, in SUPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS: TH!'2 STATUS OF BLACK WOtviEN 
141 , 143 (Margaret C. Simms & Julwn!1c M. Malveaux eds .. 1986). 
09 LENORE W,.'\LKER. THE BAHERED WOMt'N 19 tl979); Martha R. 
Mahoney, Legal/mages of Bartered rVomen: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 
90 M ICH. L. RF.V. I (l99 I). 
?tJ CRIME VICTIMS R.ESEARCI I ,\liD rtU::\Ti\IENT C1 R., RAPE IN Aiv!ERICA 3-5 
(1992). 
71 Kendall Thomas, Beyond tile i)rivacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 143 [, 
1462 ( 1992). 
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causal factor. 72 Who could reasonably deny that these are real, tangible 
harms? 
Blacks, too, continue to be victims of hate crimes; and despite 
decades of civil rights struggle, blacks in America still occupy a social 
position drastically inferior to that of whites. For example, blacks are 
twice as likely to be unemployed and three times more likely to be poor 
than whites. 73 Black infants, half of whom are born into poverty, die at 
a rate twice that of whites, and overall life expectancy is significantly 
lower for blacks than for whites.74 Who could reasonably deny that 
these are real , tangible hanns? 
This social positioning is buttressed by negative cultural images that 
affect how others view and treat members of these groups, even 
unconsciously. 75 Although we may not be able to predict the precise 
harm a particular individual will suffer because of group membership, we 
have more than ample evidence to show that all members of subordinated 
groups are worse off than they would be if the group were not oppressed. 
This is the result of subordination: the life prospects of the subordinated 
never equal those of the privileged, dominant group.76 Since people in 
these groups arc worse off than they would be without social dominance 
and social subordination, even the Lockean must agree that they arc 
harmed. 
The claim that reproduction-asslSttng technologies contribute to the 
subordinate status of oppressed groups is, then, a claim of tangible harm. 
A feminist social justice approach recognizes that policies goveming 
procreation not only afft!ct individual interests; they also shape the way 
we value the members of social gro1JpS. Trading genetic material and 
women's reproducti ve capacity on the market misvalues women's 
reproductive labor, exalts the importance of genetic relatedness, and 
71 See, e.g., Chris Bull, Suicidal Tendencies: Is Anguish over Sexual 
Orientation Causing Gay and Lesbian Tee11s to Kill Themselves?, ADVOCATE, 
Apr. 5. I 994, at 34-42. 
73 David B. Swinton, The Economic Swtus of African Americans: 
''Permanent " Poverty and fnequaii(V, in TI IF:. STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 25 
( 199 1). 
74 ivlortality Part ems ~- United Stmes. !99 2 fi·om the Centers for Disense 
Control and Prevention, 273 JAMA l 00 ( 1995). 
15 See Charles R. Lawren~.:e, Ill, The ld, the Ego and Equal Protection: 
Reckoni11g lVillz Uncons{ ious Racism, 39 STAN. L. Rrv. 317 ( 1987) ( demonstrat-
ing the prevalence of unconscious racism) 
7~ !d. at 326. 
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devalues the genetic contribution of people of color. It therefore 
reinforces gender, class, and racial inequality. 
For these reasons, feminist 8ocial justice approaches call for the 
inclusion of hrum s arising from unJuSt social relationships in deliberations 
about the government's role in the development and use of reproduction-
assisting technologies. Feminists need not abandon, however1 the liberal 
concern about government abuse of power and the danger to individual 
autonomy posed by legislative maJorities. We may be willing to pennit 
certain harms because attempting to prevent them would itself be 
substantially more harmful. The degree of government intrusion into 
individuals' procreative decis10ns requ1red tO regulate every use of 
reproduction-assisting technologies may itself be too great a hann to 
justi fy this regulation. Thus, as we pointed out earlier, a feminist social 
justice approach need not support the absolute prohibition of noncoital 
means of reproduction. But such an approach means to make clear that 
inso far as these means of reproduction add to the privileging of men over 
women, the privileging of white people over people of color, the 
privileging of heterosexual people over homosexual people, the privileg-
ing of the economically well-off over the poor, and the commodification 
of children, these means ru·e harmful and they should not be endorsed or 
in any way supported by a government that purports to take the interests 
of all its citizens equally seriously. Part of what this means is that no 
public monies should be expended on the development of these technolo-
gies unless they are equally available to all citizens, and "contracts" for 
so-called surrogate motherhood arrangements should not be enforceable. 
lY. CONCF-RNS ABOUT EXPLOfi !'\TlON AND YOLVi\jTARINESS 
Liberals also challenge the fem inist contention that "contracts" for so-
called surrogate motherhood arrangemems should not be enforced because 
they are demeamng to •,vomen. Once again, Robertson serves as an 
example when he argues that if a buth mother m one of these arrange-
ments wishes to keep the child, ''[p]nvilcging the sunogate's wtshes over 
the reliance wishes of the couple aSSL!rrtes Lhal women cannot make 
rational decisiOns about reproduction and chi ld rearing prior to concep-
tion.'117 Ruth Mackl in makes the same obJection. saymg that "[tjeminists 
who oppose sunogacy presum~ to :.::peak for all women. But what they 
are really saying is that those who ·lect to enter snrrogacy arrangements 
n ROBI:!.RTSON, supra nole 8. at l32. 
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are incompetent to choose and stand in need of protection. "711 Versions 
of this argument have been put forward by liberal feminis ts as well, for 
example, L01i Andrews, Barbara Berg, and Christine Sistare.79 
But this objection is just too quick. First, worries about exploitation 
in contract pregnancy arrangements need not come from some particularly 
feminist view. They may come from a certain view of the power 
differentiations between races, ethnic groups, and classes that pays no 
special attention to the position of women as such. Second, anyone who 
opposes these arrangements need not hold that women entering into them 
are incompetent to make such judgments for themselves and need not 
hold that these women need special protection because of some special 
vulnerability. 
A. Exploitation 
It is often argued that contract pregnancies are likely to exploit poor 
women, and particularly poor women of color. But it needs to be 
remembered that m general, at least, it is acceptable to select public 
policies that attempt to limit the activities of exploiters, even if fully 
competent people might choose to be exploitees. That is; one may 
coherently argue that the state's enforcement of these arrangements 
contributes substantial ly to soc1etal altitudes toward \VOrnen and children 
that simply ought not to be encO\.traged, in genentl, and ought not to be 
encouraged by the state, in particular. Such an argument undetmines 
Macklin's claims that ''lhe feminist charge that the practice of sun·ogacy 
exploits women is patemal i~. tic"8(J and ' ·the charge of exploitation 
contradicts the moral stance that women have the ability and the right to 
control their own bodies. "H 1 After all , juiisd1ctions commonly refuse to 
allow people to assent to being maimed or to engage in dueling, even 
though people might make such assents voluntarily. 
78 Ruth Macklin, Is l11ere rhzything Wrong with Surrogate lvfoth erltood? An 
Ethical Analysis, in SURROGA TF. MOTH!.=RI-1000 : POLITIC~ 1\ND PRIVACY 136, l4 l 
(Larry Gostin ed., 1990). 
79 Andrews, supra note 38; Barbara J. Berg, Listening to the Voices of the 
Infertile, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEM ll"!Sl PERSPEC'rJVES 80 
(Joan C. Call::lhan cd., 1 9~5); Chrisdnt. T. Sis;:are. 8~:prodt,ctive i·~reedom and 
Women 's Freedom: S11rrogacy (jnd Autonomy. 19 PlliL. F. 227 ( 1988). 
Qo Macldin, s11pra note 78, at 1.41. 
91 !d. 
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Christine Overall makes one version of this feminist social justice 
argument to Canadians with regard to commercial fonns of these 
arrangements: 
Merely mitigating the exploitive aspect of contract motherhood wh ile 
making it legal begs the general question whether the practice as a 
whole is justified, whether the Canadian state should be fostering the 
work of women as breeders and whether this is a "job" for women that 
Canadian society should endorse and support through state mechanisms. 
The legalization of contract motherhood would present reproduction for 
money as an acceptable, even desirable, aspect of women's place in 
Canadian society. But this path is incompatible with the vision of 
women as equal, autonomous, and valued members of this culture.82 
Similarly, Joan Mahoney provides a non-patemalistic argument for 
nonenforcement by showing the problems with the law's requiring 
speci fie performance of terms goveming a woman's conduct during a 
contract pregnancy and requiring relinquishment of a child after birth.83 
Since liberals often argue for the enforcement of contract motherhood 
arrangements on the ground of an analogy to sperm ''donation," Mahoney 
distinguishes genetic and gestational mothers: she argues that women who 
donate oocytes are analogous to spenn donors, but that these donors are 
not analogous to women who carry pregnancies to term, and that the law 
should not treat gestational mothers as analogous to gamete providers 
who do not participate in gestation. 84 Refusing to enforce an agreement 
to relinquish pru-cntal rights of a gestational mother, then, does not 
constitute a worrisome kind of special treatment for women. Using 
several precedents in labor law, Mahoney argues that precluding 
gestational contract mothers from contracting away their parental rights 
amounts to just one more provision among many that restrict the freedom 
of employees. The fact that only women can become pregnant does nol 
mean that such restrictions treat women as less competent and more in 
need of protection from their dccistons than men. 
At the same time, Mahoney argues that men and women are different 
in some important ways, and that j ustice might well require recognizing 
~z Overall, :mpm note 9, at 13 I . 
83 Joan Mahoney, An Essay on Surrogacy and Feminist Thought, in 
SURROGATE TYIOTiiERHOOD: POLITICS ANO PRIVACY t83 (Larry Gostin cd. , 
1990). 
" !d. at !88. 
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some of these differences. That women alone can be and are gestational 
mothers may make a difference that is appropriately recognized in law.85 
Following feminist jurists such as Ruth Colker, Ann Scale , and 
Catharine MacKinnon, Mahoney distinguishes what she calls the "anti-
subordination perspective'' from what she calls the "equality model" 
found in liberal feminist positions like Loti Andrews', which include the 
worry that special treatment of women in these arrangements (i.e., by 
nonenforcement) will only work against women.86 The anti-subordina-
tion perspective that Mahoney takes asks whether the policy or practice 
in question helps to maintain an underclass based on gender. If the law 's 
refusal to recognize gestational mothers' prenatal contracts to relinquish 
parental rights helps do away with the second-class status of women 
generally, then feminists should support nonenforcement of these 
contracts. 
B. Voluntariness 
lt is sometimes argued by feminists that contract motherhood 
arrangements should not be enforced because women cannot voluntari ly 
decide before the binh of a child whether they wi ll be willing to give up 
that child once it is born. Similar concems about voluntariness are often 
heard in regard to other reproduction-assisting technologies. For example, 
it has sometimes been argued that pronatalist attitudes exert a subtle but 
extremely strong influence on women to reproduce, and women who have 
access to these technologtes are under enom10us pressure to seek them. 87 
The pressure on women to become mothers is ·o great that some question 
85 !d. at 190. 
86 See id. at 192: CATHARiNE A. MACKl:-11 0 , SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF 
W ORKING WOMEN: A CASE or: SEX DISCRIMINATION ( 1979); Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination A bO\'e A II: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 6 I N. Y.U. L. REV. 
1003 (1986); Ann C. Scales, The EmNgence of Feminist Juri~pntdence: An 
Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986). 
87 See. e.g., GENA COR!:.A, THE :V!OTHER MI\CHI:-.!1:: REPRODUCTIVE 
TECII NOLOGIES PROM 1\IUIFTCI:\L t NSEY!It ATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 166-85 
( 1985 ); JuJith Lorber, Choice, Gift or Patriarchal Bargain ? Women's Consent 
to In Vitro Fertilization in Male lnjimility , in FEM!f'IST PERSPECTIVES IN 
M F.DlC'AL ETHICS 169 t i iclen B. 11olmes & Laura M. Purdy eds., 1992). 
Pronatalism, of course, is not uni fom1 in society. Economically well-off white 
women may be pressured by general pronatalist ani tudes to seek these technolo-
gies, but those general attitucks de) not extend to black women or poor women 
of any racial 0r ethr.ic grotlp. 
1995-96] A fEMfNIST SOCIAL JUSTICE APPROACH 1225 
whether the decision to use these technologies is a genuinely voluntary 
choice.88 Indeed, some views come close to holding that socially 
constructed pronatalism is so strong that women, even under typical 
conditions that do not require technological assistance, cannot really 
choose freely whether to take on motherhood. 9 
It is important to address these concerns directly. On the one hand, 
societal pronatalism for favored groups does result in enonnous pressure 
on some women to reproduce. There is no question about this. Our 
society does not think it is just fine for people to remain single and 
childless deliberately or for married people to remain childless deliberate-
ly. Infertility is constructed as a nearly unbearable tragedy; deliberate 
childlessness is constructed as nearly unimaginable selfishness.90 Under 
such conditions, what might be said on the question of voluntruiness in 
seeking reproductive assistance? 
It needs first to be noted that voluntariness is not an all-or-nothing 
matter~ voluntariness is a characteristic of human activity which admits 
of degrees. Further, questions about the voluntariness of an individual's 
action are necessarily contextual. For example, the criteria for making an 
acceptably voluntary purchase of an automobile are very di fferent from 
the criteria for giving an acceptably voluntary consent to a major surgery. 
So, highly general discussions of voluntariness will always be limited in 
their usefulness, much as highly general discussions of causality are 
always limited in their usefulness. For example, Joel Feinberg argues that 
the 
point of a causal citation is to single out one of the certified causal 
candidates that is especially interesting to us, given our various practical 
purposes and cognitive conc.:?ms .... Explanatory citations ingle out. 
abnonnal interferences with the non·nal course of events or hitherto 
unknown missing links in a person's understanding. They arc designed 
88 See, e.g. , Lorber, supra note 87. 
R9 See. e.g. , Martha E. Gimenez, Feminism. Pronawlism, all{/ Motherhood, 
in MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN fEMINIST THEORY 287, 293 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 
1984). 
90 Of course, and m; we have memi(med pn::v iously, we do not see 
proponents of reproductive liberty wonying about the infertility of those who are 
not white and/or who arc poor. And many of those for whom the society does 
not have pronatalist ambitions, particulariy blacks, are in P most peculiar position 
- the dominant white society is not invested in the reproduction of blacks, but 
a ma!Tied black couple deliberately childless is even more unthinkable an 
instance of selfishness. 
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simply to remove puzzlement by citing the causal factor that can shed 
the most light. Hence we can refer to the criterion of selection in 
explanatory contexts (for short) as the !aJitern criterion. Causal citations 
made from the "engineering standpoint'' are made with a view to 
facilitating control over future events by citing the most efficiently and 
economically manipulable causal factor. The criterion for selection 
[here] . .. can thus be called (for sho11) the handle criterion. The point 
of causal citations in purely blaming contexts is simply to pin the label 
of blame on the appropriate factor for further notice and practical use. 
These judgments cite a causal factor that is a human act or omission 
"stained'' (as an ancient figure of speech would have it) with fau lt. The 
criterion [here] ... can be called (for short) the srain criterion. When 
we look for 'the cause," then, we may be looking for the causal factor 
that has either a lantern, a handle or a stain on it.91 
There is, then, no such thing as "the cause" which can be cited in any 
case independent of purpose and context. ln much the same way, there 
is no such thing as a completely free action. Indeed, any action that was 
completely free or unint1.uenced would be completely random, and this 
is surely not what we mean by voluntary human action. Analogous to 
making an appropriate causal Citation, whether an action is to be 
considered appropriately or acceptably voluntary will necessarily be a 
function of our purposes and the context of the action. 
Suppose our purpose tn askmg about the voluntanness of a woman's 
choice in seeking reproduction asSIStance 1s to dec1de whether she ought 
to be prevented from obtaining assistance. When we are talking about 
voluntariness from the perspective of potential interference, we need to 
ask what is at stake and whether someone has v1able alternatives. 
Pronatalist attitudes certainly do put pressure on women to seek assistance 
in reproducing; but the pressure here is not analogous to compulsion 
(e.g., being swept up and carried oft) or coercion (e.g. , being forced at 
gunpoint). In cases of genuine compulsion or coercion, it would be 
completely unreasonable lo expect someone to resist, ~ither because she 
is being overpowered physically or because the threat to her is so 
substantial.92 rn these cases, it makes sense to say that someone is 
completely a v1ctim -that she had no real choice but to "act'' as she did. 
[f our question is whether women ~hould be precluded from seeking 
91 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO O THERS 177 (1984). 
92 See Joan C. Callahan. Paternalism and Volrmtariness, 16 C.A.NA DLAN J. 
PHIL. 199 ( 1986) 
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reproduction assistance because their choice to do so is unfree in a 
pronatalist society like our own, the answer has to be no; such interfer-
ence would not be justified on the basis of women's choices being unfree 
to the relevant degree m the relevant sense. 
On the other hand, if our purpose in asking about the voluntariness 
of women's seeking reproductton assistance is to determine whether there 
are worrisome influences at work that need to be noticed and addressed, 
it is reasonable to conclude that pronatalist social attitudes do exert a 
troubling, often insidious, mfluence on women's choices to reproduce in 
general, and to seek potentially pamful, nsky, and expensive reproduction 
assistance in particular. Feinberg, for example, argues: 
[A) person's consent is ful ly voluntary only when he is a competent and 
unimpaired adult who has not been tr..reaten~d. misled, or lied to about 
relevant facts, nor manipulated by subtle forms of conditioning. It is 
worth giving emphasis here to two points: that both force and fraud can 
invalidate consent, and that "force" can be very subtle indeed.9J 
Feinberg's use of ''scare quotes," of course, is to alert us that "force'' 
regarding human action is being used here in a way other than its usual 
way. The meaning of "force" in this context is not analogous to 
"compulsion" or "coercion," but is more like the meaning of ·'force" in 
science, where forces are understood to have greater and lesser power. 
The point (for our discussion) is that '"'e all grow up in a society that 
subjects us to various subtle fonns of conditioning, and, depending on the 
force or influence of that conditionil~g on our actions, the voluntariness 
of our choices can be impaired. 
When feminists question 'NOmen's voluntaiiness in electing reproduc-
tion assistance, part of the intent is to direct actention to these subtle 
fonns of conditioning and to point out that they do raise legitimate 
concerns about the n~asons women might have tor being so intent on 
reproducing. One way to put th1s pomt 1s to say that if we did not live in 
a society which put such celentless pressure on (at least some) women to 
reproduce, we could have complece confidence that a woman's reproduc-
tive choices wt:re not the result of manipulation by conditioning, subtle 
and often not-so-subtle. 
Feminists are also often concemt~d d1at women might be misled 
regarding the safety and efficaci ( 1f some reproduction-assisting 
technologies. There ace dangers associated with these r~chnologies that 
03 
FEINBERG, supra note 91. D.t l l 6. 
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often go unmentioned. For example, a number of these technologies 
involve inducing superovulation, which involves giving high doses of 
fertility drugs to perfectly healthy, fertile, fu lly functional women who 
are "donating" eggs for others' use or whose male panners are subfertile. 
The long-term effects of superovulation are not known; and egg 
collection has led to several deaths and a number of injuries with 
potential for causing pennanent infertility. There is a grim irony in the 
use of procedures that risk the fe1iili ty of a healthy woman to assure 
reproduction for an 1nferti le or subfertile man or an infertile woman. 
It is also the case that the more elaborate and more expensive forms 
of these technologies frequently fa il, and reporting systems have not 
required clear reports of failure rates. Robyn Rowland, for example, 
suggests that the most honest and helpful repo11ing would include fai lure 
rates instead of so-called success rates.94 She discusses a survey of IVF 
clinics in America: 
Many clinics were quot ing a :?.0 per cent success rate, using what they 
saw as the worldwide average; yet of the fifty-four clinics which 
responded to the questionnaire, halfhad never sent a client home with 
a baby . . . . Statistics were manipulated, so that some of the so-called 
pregnancies were in fact just chemical changes which might or might 
not have been an early sign of pregnancy. Hospitals would cite 
pregnancies as a success rate, as opposed to live births, and many 
hospitals counted their twms and tnplets 111 the reported totals of live 
births. Ectopic pregnanc1e:i were also rated in rhc 'success'' category. 
Most clinics usc pregnancy rates because these are much higher than the 
Jive birth rates due to the high rates of ectopic pregnancies, stillbirths 
and spontaneous abqrtions.~s 
One set of recent figures shows that of 19,079 treatment cycles, 16,405 
(eighty-six percent) involved successful egg retrievals, 14,150 (seventy-
four percent) involved successful transfers leading to 3057 (s ixteen 
percent) pregnancies, which culminated in 2345 (twelve percent) 
deliveries.96 Of these delivelies, 673 (twenty-eight percent) were multi-
94 
ROIWN ROWLAND, LIVI.'ICi LABORATORiES: WOMI::.N AND REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 44 (1992). 
95 !d. 
% John F. Randolph. Jr. (DireCLOi' of the Division of Reproductive 
Endocrinology, Departm:!nt or Obstetrics and Gynecology, University of 
Michigan Medical Center), l'~Jcl!c lcctt.JJe Gponsored by the GTE foundation 
Lectureship ProgrJm in Tt::i.:hl1\)logy 3nJ Ethics at Transylvania Uni\crsity (Apr. 
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pie gestations.97 If each of these multiple births involved only twins 
(which they did not), that would mean that ar most 1346 treatment cycles 
of 19,079 (seven percent) could be counted as successful.9H On 
Rowland's suggestion for giving figures, that 's a ninety-three percent 
failure rate. The statistics for GIFT and ZIFT are even worse.99 Rowland 
puts it baldly: "[J]n any other technological area [this) would be 
considered a gross failure and immediately discontmued."100 
Add to this that roughly thirty-five percent of couples "diagnosed" as 
infertile ultimately succeed in achieving pregnancy with no treatment, 101 
and the wisdom of applying these technologies becomes highly question-
able, at best. Yet, desptte the discomforts, nsks, financial costs, and 
dismal success rates of these programs, women who have the financial 
means to afford them continue to enroll in them. 102 If enrolling women 
do not understand the failure rates of these programs, their participation 
in them is not acceptably voluntary. On the other hand, if women do 
understand the high failure rates of these programs, yet they continue to 
take on the discomfort, risk, and expense of them, Lhis raises pertinent 
questions about their desperation for children genetically connected to 
them and/or their male partners as well as questions about the source of 
that desperation. We do not want to suggest that women entering these 
programs are so desperate that their choices ro do so are so involuntary 
that they should not be permitted to make these choices, but we do want 
to suggest that when a woman is so "desperate" to have a child genetical-
ly related to her and/or her partner that she seeks special reproduction-
ass isting services that are painful, often humiliating,103 risky, tremen-
dou~ ly expensive, and, at the same time, highly unlikely to yield the child 
29, 1993). 
91 Jd. 
9H Jd. 
qq !d. 
100 R OWLAND, supra note 94. at 48. 
101 See, e.g., John A. Col ti ns et al., Treawumt-independcnr Pregnancy Among 
ft((ercile Couples, 309 NF.\v ENG. 1. MED. 1201, UG2 (1983). 
102 De eloperE; and provtders of these technologies continue to utilize public 
funds (in the fonn of research suppon and the utilization of public fac ilities, such 
as state universities) and to press for privat~ insurance can·iers to cover their 
costs. At the same time, and not surprisingly. none of these proponents press for 
Medicaid or Medicare funding for applying thcsl) technologies to those without 
the ability w pay for them. 
103 See, for example, Rowt AND, s11pra note 9-l, at 29-30. who includes 
testimony from women who have participated in these programs. 
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she seeks, she is acting on a motive that is socially constructed and that 
may well compromise the voluntariness of her choice. 
Many feminists have argued that the so-called desperation of the 
infertile is a social construction. 10"1 Indeed, it is a social construction 
twice over. First, women's experience of desperation in wanting a 
"genetically appropriate" child is largely the result of social attitudes 
toward infertility. Second, even if an inferti le woman does not experience 
desperation for a "genetically appropriate" child, she is constructed as 
desperate and as someone who should be willing to do all that she can to 
produce such a child. As Naomi Pfeffer says, "What is required of the 
infertile is that they submit in silence to the claim that they are desper-
ate."105 The groundwork for such a requirement is clearly laid in liberal 
discussions of the value of genetic reproduction, such as John Robert-
son's, which assume without argument a fundamental connection between 
reproduction of one's genes and one's self-identity. 106 But this is not a 
claim likely to be made by a woman; and it is a claim quite likely to be 
rejected by a feminist. Indeed, feminists have often argued that the 
emphasis on genetic connections is intimately tied to patriarchy, both 
historically and contemporarily, 107 particularly in its racist manifesta-
tion. 108 Women may well be deeply mvested in experiencing pregnancy, 
childbirth, nursing, and parenting ~- ~xperiences that accompany ordinary 
reproduction in the ordincu·y way ·- but this is emphatically not equivalent 
to being deeply invested in h~ving a child genetically related to them 
and/or their male spouses. The whole cm!)hasJs on genetically-related 
children that inforrns Robertson·s view, then, is found by social justice 
femini sts to be suspecr as a pr:rspective that 1s characteristic of women; 
and if it is not characteristic of women, this is just one more occasion on 
10
£ See, e.g., Naomi Pfeffer, ,{rtifi.::ial Insemination, ln-vitrn F'errilization and 
the Stigma ofli?(ertili(v, ill R.EPf<ODUCT!VE TECliNOLOntES: GFNDER, MOTHER-
HOOD AND M EDICINE 8 I (Mkh.:.llc St3.11\'.'\Jrlh .ed., l ~87). 
lOS fc/. at 9} . 
106 ROB£R"J"$0,'1, supra 110 ( t' :l. 
107 See, e.g., id. at 2'1, 98; BA.IUJARA K. f<.OTHM.Al'l, RECREATING NiOTHER-
HOOD: IDEOLOOY AND TECllNOLOCi'/ 1111 A PA"I ' i~:A ttCHAL SOC!i:.TY ( 1 939)~ Joan 
Mahoney, Adoption as a Femim.:r .-J.Itel",wtive to Reproductive Technology, in 
REPRODUCflON. ETH !CS, .A J'iD l~lr; L1\W: t:Er;Jli'.TST PERSPECTl"ES 35 (Joan C. 
Callahan .;d., 1995); Pat-t icia Si"i"li1h, Selfish G;!r!.!,\ t.md lvfmemal 1'/fyrhs: A Look 
at Postmt:!I:OJXWsal Pregna11cy, in \ 1J:.i-IO?AUSE: .0.. l' . .11DLJ ;:E ?ASSAGE 92 (Joan 
C. Callahan td., 1993). 
10
$ See Rob•~!ts , Th.! Gq;u:.:"c Ti~ . sup."' 11-..tc 53. 
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which liberalism has left out the perspective of women taking the 
perspective of men as the norm . 
ln sum, then, a feminist social justice approach is an antisubordina-
tion perspective that is no more a forn1 of legal moralism than is 
liberalism, and a proponent of this perspective can argue against the 
deployment of reproduction-assisting technologies and against the state's 
enforcing contract motherhood arrangements without assuming that 
women are incompetent or in need of special protection simply because 
they are women. At the same time, (selecttve) pronatalism in a society 
can and does put women under considerable, if often subtle, pressure to 
produce children genetically related to themselves and/or their male 
pattners. Although this does not render women incompetent to decide 
whether to use these technologies, it does raise important questions about 
possible compromises of voluntanness on the part of women who seek 
these technologies, particularly those technologies that are painful, risky, 
very expensive, and highly prone to failure. 
CONCLUSION: THE STATE 1S PROPER ROLE fN 
PROTECTING AND ENHANCfNO PROCREATIVE LIDERTY 
The liberal notion of procreative liberty encompasses only the right 
against state interference with personal decisions about reproduction. As 
we have mentioned, this view follows the prevailing jurispntdence that 
the Constitution protects only an individual's "negative" right to be free 
from unjustified intrusion, rather than the ··positive'' right actually to lead 
a free life. 109 Consistent with its predominant concem with government 
neutrality, liberal theory docs not recognize an afftrmative entitlement to 
the resources needed to procreate. A· Robertson explains, procreative 
libeny "means that a person v io late~ no moral duty in making a 
procreative choice, and that other persons have a duty not to interfere 
with that choice"' but "does not imply the duty of others to provide the 
resources or services necessary tc, ~xercise one's procreative liberty 
despite plausible moral arguments for govenunent assistance. niiO Thus, 
101 See generally CASS R. SU"NSTEIN, f ilE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1994); 
Susan Bandes. The Negative Coii.Sll/utiOll.' A Critique, 88 MICH. L. Rr.v. 2271 
(1990) (arguing that obligations to act, pruvidc or protect have not been held to 
be enforceable constitutional rights); Robin W~;;;:\ t. Progressive and Conservative 
Constitutionalism, 83 MICH. L Rc v. 64 1 { 1990) (positing that a conservative 
construction of the Constitution has pn-:vailed under both conservative and liberal 
couns). 
111
' ROBI:RTSON, supra nOLe 8, <~t 2.3 . 
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the definition of procreative liberty as a purely negative right exempts the 
state from any obligation to ensure the social conditions and resources 
necessary for autonomous decisiomnaking about reproduction. 111 
The Supreme Court elaborated the distinction between the negative 
and positive protection of reproductive rights in a series of cases 
concerning the government's obligation to subsidize the poor woman 's 
right to an abortion. 112 In these cases, the Court refused to require the 
state or federal government to pay for the cost of abortion services for 
poor women, even though it pays for the expenses incident to childbirth. 
The Harris Court reasoned: ''[l]t simply does not follow that a woman 's 
freedom of choice canies with it a constitutional entitlement to the 
financial resources to avai l herself of the full range of protected 
choices .. . . (A)lthough govenm1ent may not place obstacles in the path 
of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those 
not of its own creation.''11 3 
Feminist legal scholars have pointed to the abortion-funding cases as 
a prime example of the limits of constitutional privacy doctrine. 114 They 
note that framing the abortion right as a right merely to be shielded from 
state intrusion into private choices provides no basis for a constitutional 
claim to public suppoti for abortions. Catharine MacKtnnon, for example, 
concludes that abortion as a pnvate privilege serves to perpetuate gender 
inequality because 1t fai ls to recogmze the ways in which social forces 
constrain women's reproductive decisiOns: ' ~The point is that [women's] 
altematives are precluded prior to the reach of the chosen legal doctrine. 
They are precluded by conditions of sex, race, and class - the very 
conditions the privacy frame not only leaves tacit but exists to g uaran-
tee.''1 15 Like the liberal v1ew of hann and volunta1iness, the liberal view 
of the state's role ignores the role that social position plays in detennin-
ing individuals' reproductive choices. 
A feminist social justice critique of the negative interpretation of 
liberty demonstrates a serious flaw in liberal theorizing about rights. But 
we need not abandon the liberal model of rights and adopt a positive 
notion of liberty to minim ize the government's facilitabon of reproduc~ 
111 See Roberts, Punishing Drug ,...Jddicts, supra note 1. at 1473. 
112 See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1989); Harris 
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 3 l5 ( 1980); Maherv. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). 
11 3 Harris, 448 U.S. at 3 16. 
114 See, e.g. ~ RUTH CaLKER, ,f.l,. BORTION AND DIALOGUE ( 1992); CATHAR-
!NE MACKINNON, FE\IliNlSM UNMODIFIED ! 0 I ( 1987): see also ROSALIND 
PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WotviEN'S CHOfCE 295-302 (\ 984). 
11 ~ MACl<JNNON, supra now l J4, at 10!. 
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tion-assisting technologies. The prohibition of unjustified state interfer-
ence with liberty does not prevent the state from refusing to support 
reproduction-assisting technologies. Even the negative view of liberty 
leaves the state free to decide not to lend affirmative assistance to 
individuals who choose to use these technologies. 
According to the liberal noninterference model, the state is not 
required to support individuals' use of these technologies in any way. 
Liberals who argue that the state must facilitate the use of these 
technologies, by enforcing paid pregnancy contracts for instance, are thus 
caught in a serious internal mcons1stency. Although fa iling to enforce 
these contracts may discourage couples from entering into these 
arrangements, liberal theory does not require the state to promote 
procreative arrangements in this way. As we noted above, enforcing these 
contracts privileges the procreative interests of more powerful men over 
the procreative interests of poore:r gestational mothers. Liberals seem 
willing to depart from the noninterference model only for the sake of the 
most ptivileged members of society. But this, of course is patently 
unfair. 
A feminist sociaJ justice approach not only highlights this inconsisten-
cy in the liberal position but also supports state refusal to encourage the 
development and deployment of reproduction-ass isting technologies. · 
These technologies' contribution to the subordinati on of women, poor 
people, and people of color justifies the government's decision to refrain 
from facilitating them. The state shoul.d not lend its affim1ative support 
to practices that demean members of society and deepen already existing 
social inequities. Under this view, the state should refuse to enforce paid 
pregnancy contracts because they commodify children, degrade all 
women's reproductive labor, and. particularly, devalue women and 
children of color. Indeed, the state could refuse to spend any public 
resources for the development or deployment of reproduction-assist ing 
technologies on the basis of their harmful effects. The government's total 
departure from this field, on the other hand, like the total prohibition or 
non-coital means of procreation, may also be substantively harmful. 
Rather than lead to a ban of public spending on reproduction-assisting 
technologies, a feminist social justice approach might call for public 
funding strategies designed to reduce the concentration of the use of these 
technologies among the most nftluent, theieby addrcs:> ing the problem of 
privilege anJ subordination. 
How i the feminist arguntent that the state should not support 
reproduction-assisting technologies ai;.y different from the liberal 
argumenr that the state need nol support women's access to abortion 
services? The difference iies in feminist'·' attention to social power. A 
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feminist social justice approach rejects certain state facilitation of these 
tcchnologie because of their contribution to an unjust social structure. 
Thus, a feminist social ju tice approach takes more seriously the moral 
equality of persons than does liberalism, since liberalism leaves this 
structure intact, and uses methods that continue to sustain it. A feminist 
social justice approach also calls for state assistance of women's right to 
an abortion because the abortion right is essential to eliminating women's 
social subordination and to ensuring that a woman's choice not to be a 
parent can always be realized. Both these positions are consistent with a 
predominant concern fo r dismantling unjust arrangements of race, class, 
and gender power and both are consistent with ensuring substantive 
liberty lor all in our society , not just for those in privileged groups. 
Unlike the liberal view of liberty, the feminist social justice approach 
does not hinge on the false dichotomy between state interference and 
noninterference. 116 Rather, it seeks to achieve a society free of invidious 
hierarchies that materially impair certain individuals' reproductive 
autonomy. 
An examination of contemporary reproduction-assisting technologies, 
then, shows that a femi niRt social justice approach is superior to 
liberalism on the two axiological axes that undergird liberal theory itself. 
That is, a feminist social JUStice approach is better able than liberalism to 
serve as a .socJal and political theory on which to base a poli tical society 
lhat takes the liberty and moral equality of all its citizens equally 
seriously. 
116 For femin ist critiques on the fals~ dichotomy between state interference 
and nonintt:rferencc, see Jenn ifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources. 
Tf1011gll rs and Pf)SSibilities, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 18 ( 1989) (noting that 
the market " is not a freestanding, narural phenomenon, but consists of rules 
defined by law and backed by the power of the state"); Frances E. Olsen, The 
Fami(l' onrl th t! lvlark.ec: ..-1 Srucly of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 H ARV. L. 
REV. 1 -~97 ( 1983 ); Frances E. Olsen, The lvfy rh of Stare intervention in the 
Fwni!y. I~ U. MlClt .T.L. RH. 835 ( 1985). 
